This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, each individual must have the incentive to abide by those norms, and so we investigate the structure of stable insurance networks, in which self-enforcement constraints are satisfied. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. First, they act as conduits for transfers. Second, they act as conduits for information. These features affect the scope for insurance, as well as the severity of punishments in the event of noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable networks as networks which are suitably "sparse", the degree of sparseness being related to the length of the minimal cycle that connects any triple of agents. As corollaries, we find that both "thickly connected" networks (such as the complete graph) and "thinly connected" networks (such as trees) are likely to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability. Finally, we study in more detail the notion of networks as conduits for transfers, by simply assuming a punishment structure (such as autarky) that is independent of the precise architecture of the network. This allows us to isolate a bottleneck effect: the presence of certain key agents who act as bridges for several transfers. Bottlenecks are captured well in a feature of trees that we call decomposability, and we show that all decomposable networks have the same stability properties and that these are the least likely to be stable. JEL Classification Numbers: D85, D80, 012, Z13
Introduction
This paper studies networks of informal insurance. Such networks exist everywhere, but especially so in developing countries and in rural areas where credit and insurance markets are scarce and income fluctuations are endemic. Yet it is also true that everybody does not enter into reciprocal insurance arrangements with everybody else, even in relatively small village communities. A recent empirical literature (see for instance Fafchamps (1992) , Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , and Murgai, Winters, DeJanvry and Sadoulet (2002)) shows that insurance schemes often takes place within subgroups in a community. One obvious reason for this is that everyone may not know one another at a level where such transactions become feasible, but -as Ray (2003, 2005) have argued -there may also be strategic reasons for limited group formation.
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At the same time, even the supposition that insurance takes place in fully formed groupssmall or large -may be open to question. A may insure with B, and B with C, but A and C may have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, such networks have attracted attention and have recently been mapped to some extent: for instance, Stack (1974) , Wellman (1992) , de Weerdt (2002), Dercon and de Weerdt (2000) , and Fafchamp and Gubert (2004) reveal a complex architecture of risk-sharing networks. It is now widely recognized that social networks (based on kin, gender or occupation) play a dominant role in people's protection to risk in developing countries.
The very idea of an insurance network rather than a group suggests that our existing idea of insurance as taking place within an explicit "club" of several people may be misleading. Of course, such clubs may well exist, but a significant segment of informal insurance transactions is bilateral. A and B will have their very own bilateral history of kindness, reciprocity or betrayal. In these histories, either party may have been have cognizant of (and taken into account) her partner's obligations to (or receipts from) a third individual, but the fundamental relationship is nevertheless bilateral.
A principal aim of our paper is to build a model of risk-sharing networks which captures this feature. In the model studied here, only "directly linked" agents in some given 2 network make bilateral transfers to each other, though they are aware of the (aggregate) transfers each makes to others. Linked agents have information only on each other's commitments, but not necessarily on the overall insurance scheme of the community.
Our approach takes an eclectic view to the extent of insurance between any linked pair. We view insurance as based on internalized norms regarding mutual help. A bilateral transfer arrangement between two linked agents is viewed as a bilateral transfer norm, determining the agents' transfer to each other as a function of their identities, the network component they belong to, their income realizations and the transfers made to or received from other agents. Based on these bilateral transfer norms between all pairs of agents, we define a consistent transfer scheme as a fixed point of the resulting mapping. Examples of transfer norms include equal sharing, in which consumptions of linked agents are equated in each state, non-welfarist norms in which agents keep a fraction of their resource (their income plus the transfer received from 1 Genicot and Ray build on a large literature which studies insurance schemes with self-enforcement constraints; others) and divide the remaining, and Nash bargaining, in which transfers are chosen to maximize the Nash product, given the outside options of each agent.
With this setup as background, the paper then studies the stability of insurance networks, explicitly recognizing the possibility that the lack of commitment may destabilize insurance arrangements among the network. Individual agents cannot be forced to participate in the scheme and pay the transfers they are called to make. Stable mutual insurance schemes must be selfenforcing.
But precisely what does self-enforcement entail? In the "group-based" insurance paradigm, a natural supposition is that a deviating individual is thereafter excluded from the group, and that is what the bulk of the literature assumes. Yet if arrangements are fundamentally bilateral, this sort of exclusion needs to be looked at afresh. If A deviates from some arrangement with B, we take it as reasonable that B refuses to engage in future dealings with A. 3 The payoff consequences of this refusal may be taken to be the weakest punishment for A's misbehavior. But the punishment may conceivably be stronger: B might "complain" to third parties. If such parties are linked directly to A they, too, might break their links (such breakage would be sustained by the usual repeated-game style construction that zero interaction always constitutes an equilibrium). To go further, third parties might complain to fourth parties, who in turn might break with A if they are directly linked, and so on. Such complaints will travel along a "communication network" which in principle could be different from the network determining direct transfers, but in this paper we take the two networks to be the same. 4 If all agents are indirectly connected in this way, then the limiting case in which all news is passed on -and corresponding action taken -is the one of full exclusion typically assumed in the literature. We propose to examine the intermediate cases.
The first principal result (Proposition 2) of the paper provides a full characterization of those insurance networks that satisfy the self-enforcement constraint for different "levels" of communication. By "level" we refer to the number of rounds q of communication (and consequent retribution) that occur following a deviation: for instance, if the immediate victim talks to no one else, q = 0, if she talks to her friends who talk to no one else, then q = 1, and so on. For any such q, we provide a characterization of those network architectures that are stable under the class of monotone insurance norms, those in which the addition of new individuals to a connected component by linking them to one member increases that member's payoff. The characterization involves a particular property of networks. As an implication, for any q, typically both thinly and thickly connected networks are most conducive to stability; intermediate degrees of connection are usually unstable.
To obtain an intuitive feel for this implication, imagine that q is small. Yet if the network is very thin the miscreant may still be effectively cut off (and thereby punished) even though the accounts of his deviation do not echo fully through the network (he was tenuously connected anyway). On the other hand, if the network is fully connected a single round of complaints to third parties is also enough to punish the miscreant, because there will be many such "third parties" and they will all be connected to him. It is precisely in networks of intermediate density that the deviant may be able to escape adequate punishment.
While an analytical demonstration of this U-shaped relationship between network density and our characterization appear difficult, we attempt to demonstrate this through simulation. [Of course, the characterization itself is entirely analytic.]
This sort of analysis highlights two, possibly conflicting, forces in the relation between the architecture of the network and the stability of insurance schemes: a transit or bottleneck effect that arises from the restriction that transfers must only take place between linked agents, and an information effect that determines the capacity of the network to punish its deviant. However, in our characterization we focus on the case in which discount factors are close to unity, and hence the informational effect is dominant in determining the architecture of stable networks. In the remainder of the paper we study the transit effect as well. This requires us to examine discount factors which are not close to unity.
Assessing the stability of mutual insurance schemes in such contexts is a difficult task. We do so assuming a specific risk-sharing norm: equal sharing, in which all pairs of agents divide their income (net of third-party obligations but including third-party transfers) equally at every state.
As transfers can only flow along links in the network, the consistent transfer scheme associated with such a norm may effectively require excessive reliance on a particular "bottleneck" agent, which in turn increases her short term incentive to deviate from the scheme. If we abstract from the subtleties of the information effect by assuming that all deviants are punished by full exclusion (say q is large), then this effect becomes particularly clear, as the post-deviation continuation value for every agent is the same. In this situation, one can identify -for any networkthe "bottleneck" agent by simply looking at the maximal short-term incentive to deviate. The enforcement constraint faced by this bottleneck agent defines the stability of the entire network. In Propositions 3 and 4, we isolate a class of "decomposable" networks (which includes all stars and lines) for which the bottleneck effect is identical, and hence stability conditions are identical. Moreover, we show that decomposable networks are the networks for which the bottleneck effects are the most acute. The addition of new links can only relax the bottleneck effect, as new links can be used to reroute transfers at every state. It follows that adding links only improves the stability of the network, and that the complete network is stable for lower values of the discount factor than any other network.
However, this finding is for the case of strong punishments, in which all agents are punished by full exclusion. For weaker punishment schemes, we show that a higher density in a network has an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, it reduces the bottleneck effects, thereby helping stability, but, as seen earlier, it also reduces the potential punishment a deviant would suffer which hurts stability.
We believe that this paper represents a first step to the study of self-enforcing insurance schemes in networks. In taking this step, we combine methods from the basic theory of repeated games, which are commonly used for models of informal insurance, with the more recent theories of networks. It appears that this combination does yield some new insights, principal among them being our characterization of stable networks. However, it is only fair to add that we buy these insights at a price. For instance, it would be of great interest to study the case in which the aggregate of third-party transfers is not observable. This would introduce an entirely new set of incentive constraints, and is beyond the scope of the present exercise.
Qualifications notwithstanding, our findings contribute to a recent and growing literature on the influence of network structures in economics. See for instance, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) on labor markets, Goyal and Joshi (2003) on networks of cost-reducing alliances, Bramoullé and Kranton (2004) on public goods, Tesfatsion (1997 Tesfatsion ( , 1998 
Transfer Norms in Insurance Networks
2.1. Endowments, Preferences and networks. We consider a community of individuals, all identical except for their positions in a social network (see below). At each date, a state of nature θ (with probability p(θ)) is drawn from some finite set Θ. The state determines a strictly positive endowment y for each agent. Denote by y(θ) the vector of income realizations for all agents. Assume symmetry: if y is the realization at state θ and y is a permutation of y, then there is another state θ with p(θ) = p(θ ) and y = y(θ). Finally, assume that every possible inter-individual combination of (a finite set of) outputs has strictly positive probability. [This condition guarantees, in particular, that outputs are not perfectly correlated.]
All agents are endowed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u defined over consumption, which is smooth, increasing and strictly concave. They have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Individual consumption will not generally equal individual income as agents will make transfers to one another. However, we assume that the good is perishable and that the community as a whole has no access to outside credit, so aggregate consumption cannot exceed aggregate income at any date.
Agents interact in a social network. Formally, this is a graph g -a collection of pairs of agents -with the interpretation that the pair ij belongs to g if they are directly linked. In this paper, a bilateral link is a given: it comes from two individuals getting to know each other for reasons exogenous to the model. While such links may be destroyed (for instance, due to an unkept promise), no new links can be created.
For our purposes, a link between i and j means two things. First, it means that i and j can make transfers to each other. Second, it is a possible avenue for the transmission of information (more on this below).
Of course, linkage can mean many things and presently we shall discuss some of the implications, but for now we simply mean that i and j are linked if and only if they can make transfers to each other.
Bilateral Transfer Norms.
In sharp contrast to existing literature, we take a decentralized view of insurance. Any two linked individuals may insure each other, but no scheme is worked out in larger groups. To be sure, transfers from or to an individual must take into account what her partner is likely to receive from (or give to) third parties. In many situations this is easier said than done, but as a first approximation we assume that the aggregate of such transfers between the partner and third parties is indeed observable, as also the incomes of each partner.
In short, for a linked pair ij, incomes y i and y j , and total transfers received from (or made to) third parties by each agent: z i and z j , are observed. These latter variables are actually mappings from the state θ to transfer outcomes; their exact form will be pinned down in societywide equilibrium.
For instance, consider a three person network in which B is linked to both A and C. Use the notation x ij to denote the transfer, positive or negative, from j to i. Figure 1 illustrates transfers that equate consumptions in a state in which B and C's income is 1 while A's income is 0.
Note that two individuals are connected in a network if they are directly or indirectly linked, and the components of a network are the largest subsets of connected individuals.
Figure 1. Bilateral Transfer Scheme
A bilateral transfer norm is a specification of transfers for every linked pair of individuals, as a function of various observables. Such observables include individual identities i and j and, of course, the realizations y i , y j , z i and z j . Thus in its most general form, a bilateral transfer norm generates a mapping
for every linked pair. A transfer norm is presumably the expression of some underlying social norm (possibly commonly held across different pairs in the same society). Now, once we know the third-party transfer functions, a transfer norm (as described in (1)) generates a transfer scheme, which is just a function of the state θ. Formally, the scheme x ij is defined by
for every θ.
Consistent Transfer Schemes.
Recall that third-party transfers are endogenous functions of the state. Indeed, the bilateral schemes defined in (2) determine these functions. Conversely, as we've already seen, these functions determine the bilateral schemes. Informally, a transfer scheme is consistent if it is a collection of bilateral schemes and third-party transfer functions that determine each other.
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The following proposition deals with the existence of consistent schemes. As a leading example, consider the case of an equal-sharing transfer norm, in which every bilateral transfer is chosen to equalize consumption across a linked pair, so that for all θ, x ij (θ) 5 More formally, the collection {x k } (for every linked pair k ∈ g) induces third-party transfer functions as follows:
If, given these functions, the bilateral transfer functions are described as in (2), we have a consistent transfer scheme.
It is easy to see that there is a unique consistent scheme associated with the equal-sharing norm, and that is "global" equal sharing of total output in any connected component of the network. 6 We will return to equal-sharing norms later in the paper. A different family of norms comes from giving an individual unqualified rights (or obligations) over some fraction of the resources (or debts) at her disposal, and requiring the division of the remainder according to some rule. A contraction-mapping argument can be employed to generate a consistent transfer scheme in this case. Finally, it is also possible to generate bilateral schemes by maximizing bilateral welfare functions that depend (for every linked pair ij) on c i and c j . Such functions may also depend on the ambient network component and the identity of the agents, if they serve as proxies for "outside options" that matter for normative purposes.
There are some situations in which nontrivial consistent schemes do not exist. As an example, suppose there are three agents connected to each other in a circle. Assume that players 1 and 2 have a social norm that involves giving player 2 2/3 of their joint endowment. Likewise, players 2 and 3 wish to give player 3 2/3 of their joint endowment, and a symmetric circle is completed by players 3 and 1. Obviously, a serious incompatibility exists. One might react to this by saying that there is no consistent transfer scheme, or by stating that -given the lack of "agreement" -each player simply consumes in the end her own endowment. The assumption of bounded transfers in the statement of the proposition achieves the latter, creating an "artificial transfer" between each linked pair of players equal to the exogenous upper bound and thereby forcing each player to consume her income endowment. For the results we obtain, either interpretationnonexistence or autarky -will do.
So much for existence: what about uniqueness? Consider the following additional restriction: bilateral norms between i and j depend on z i and z j only through their sum at each state, z i (θ) + z j (θ) (and in addition may depend on i, j, y i (θ), y j (θ) and d as before). Moreover, assume that consumptions are normal, that is both consumptions in each state are increasing in this sum. Then there is a unique consistent transfer scheme in the sense of outcomes: consumption vectors are fully pinned down in every state.
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Equal division and other welfarist norms will typically satisfy the above property and will generate unique consistent solutions (in consumption space). Non-welfarist norms, such as the private domain norms discussed above, do not satisfy the additional restriction. However, different uniqueness arguments can be made for such norms using contraction arguments (we omit a more detailed discussion for the sake of brevity). 6 The equal-sharing norm, apart from its intrinsic interest, has the feature that there is some "multilateral norm" with which it is consistent; in this case, multilateral equal sharing. Bilateral transfer norms that allocate to each person a weighted share of consumption (depending perhaps on that person's identity or her income realization) also have this feature provided that the relative weights for every pair {ij} equal the relative weights arrived at "indirectly" by compounding relative weights along any other path joining i to j. 7 For if this were false, then there are two consistent schemes and a state θ such that the induced vectors of consumptions across individuals in that state are distinct. Refer to these vectors as {c k (θ)} and {c k (θ)}. Then in some state there must be some linked pair ij such that c i (θ) ≤ c i (θ) and c j (θ) > c j (θ), but this violates normality.
For every network, or more precisely, for every connected component d and for every consistent transfer scheme x associated with that component, denote by w i (d, x) the expected payoff accruing to member i.
Monotone Norms.
Say that a transfer norm is "monotone" if whenever more individuals are brought into a connected network by being connected to one individual, this individual's payoff increases. Intuitively, more individuals create better insurance possibilities, and a monotone transfer norm should give some of the extra benefits to the individual serving as a "bridge".
Formally, suppose that g and g , with g ⊆ g , are two connected components such that N (g) ⊂ N (g ). Suppose, moreover, that jk ∈ g only if jk ∈ g for all j, k = i. Then, say that the transfer norm is monotone if for every pair of associated consistent transfer schemes x (for g) and
, where w i is the expected-payoff function.
Notice that monotonicity embodies more than a purely normative definition; it requires that a consistent solution not "misbehave" as we move across networks.
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It is easily seen that the equal division norm is monotone. It would be interesting to describe the full class of norms which satisfies monotonicity, though we do not know the answer to this question.
Enforcement Constraints and Stability
While a transfer norm, as defined by us, comes from a fairly general class, it is time to emphasize a particular feature (already discussed in the Introduction). These norms are primarily "normative" in that they take little or no account of self-enforcement constraints. But this isn't to say that such constraints do not exist. Each individual may recognize that as a social being she is constrained to abide by the transfer norm in her dealings with j, provided that she wants to maintain those dealings. But she may not want to maintain them. It may be that (in some states) the transfer she is called upon to make outweighs the future benefits of maintaining a relationship with j under the transfer norm. If that is the case, something must give, either the norm or the ij link. Our paper takes the point of view that the norm is more durable than the link, and that the link will ultimately fail.
[Generally speaking then, should we conceive of norms as restricted or unrestricted by incentives? This is an important open question that we do not pretend to address in any satisfactory way. Norms may range all the way from the fully idealistic (purely derived from ethical considerations, such as equal-sharing) to the purely pragmatic (wary of all enforcement and participation constraints, with ethical matters only invoked subject to the limits posed by such constraints). In this paper, we take the point of view that norms are not constrained by incentives, but of course we do use such incentive constraints to see if the resulting transfer schemes will or will not survive.]
In a network setting, an agent could choose to renege on some (or all) transfers that she is required to make under a particular bilateral norm. In line with the bulk of the literature on risk-sharing without commitment (see, e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993), Fafchamps (1996) This much may be clear, but nevertheless the extent of the punishment imposed on a deviant remains ambiguous. What about the rest of society, who were not directly harmed by the deviant? Do they, too, sever links with the deviant?
The answer to this question depends in part on what we are willing to assume about the extent of information flow in the society. In turn, this forces us to ask the question of just what the network links precisely mean. They certainly limit physical transfers, but do they also limit the flow of information? One possible interpretation is that the network represents a set of physical conduits and physical conduits alone, while information flows freely across all participants and is not constrained in any way by the architecture of the network. In this case the following notion of a punishment may be appropriate:
Strong Punishment. Following a deviation, every agent severs its direct link (if any) with the deviant, so that the deviant is thereafter left in autarky.
In models of informal insurance in groups with self-enforcement constraints, this is the commonly adopted punishment structure. But in such scenarios, there are no networks, insurance is fully multilateral, and the event of a deviation is common knowledge among the group as a whole. In a situation in which network effects are under explicit consideration, the opposite presumption may seem more natural:
Weak Punishment. Following a deviation, only those agents who have been directly mistreated by the deviant sever their links (with the deviant).
In our view, this concept is more appropriate to the case at hand than strong punishment. In the model that we study, insurance is bilateral, and linked agent pairs know relatively little about the particulars of other dealings (only the aggregate of transfers made to or received from third parties).
9 So it is entirely consistent to impose the restriction that while directly injured parties react, other agents do not, while strong punishments are more appropriate to a multilateral situation in which there are no restrictions on information flows and no network effects.
At the same time, if we take the network structure seriously, not just as a routeway for physical transfers but also for the flow of information, then we can define "intermediate" layers of punishment that are worth investigation in their own right. For instance, if I am an injured party and can communicate with those I am directly linked to, I can tell them about my experience. One might then adopt the equilibrium selection rule that all the individuals I talk to sever direct links (if any) with the deviant.
To be sure, once this door is opened, we might entertain notions in which the news of an individual's mistreatment "radiates outwards" over paths of length that exceed a single link, and all those who hear about the news breaks off direct links (if any) with the original deviant. There are many ways to model such a scenario: we take the simplest route by indexing such punishments by the length of the required path.
Level-q Punishments. Following a deviation, all agents who are connected to a victim by a path not exceeding length q (but not via the deviant) sever direct links (if any) with the deviant. In this definition, q is to be viewed as a nonnegative integer, so that weak punishment may be thought of as a special case in which q = 0. In this sense, level-q punishments are quite general.
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Notice that we effectively treat q as an exogenous parameter to measure the extent of information flow. The reader may question whether the passing-on of news about deviations may be counter to one's own interests (see a recent paper by Lippert and Spagnolo (2005) -though not on insurance -for more discussion on this point). However, this issue is not critical here as our punishment scheme could be sustained as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Individuals who are the direct victims, as well as informed neighbors of a deviant, and the deviant will not make any positive transfer to each other if they do not expect reciprocity. In this case, if the deviant believes that one of his neighbors is informed of his deviation, he will stop making transfer to her. Given these beliefs, it is an equilibrium strategy for individuals on the path from and including the victim to the neighbor to transmit the information on the deviation. Of course, there may be equilibria in which badly treated partners resume dealings with the deviant or fail to pass the information, but we do not consider such subgame strategies. Individuals who are the direct victims or informed of a deviation are presumed to transmit the information and impose sanctions according to the punishment scheme. Now, given a level-q punishment structure in place and given a norm, we may define q-stable networks. (Sometimes, when there is no danger of ambiguity, we shall simply use the term "stable" instead of q-stable.) Consider a community of n individuals and a norm x defined over all possible pairs of individuals. Because deviations result in the severance of links, we need to assess the stability recursively on networks among these individuals. To this end, we begin with the empty graph in which all individuals live in isolation. The expected lifetime utility of an agent living in autarchy (normalized by the discount factor to a per-period equivalent) is
The empty graph is obviously stable, as no transfers are called for and there is no question of a deviation. And there is only one payoff vector associated with that stable graph: v * (∅) ≡ {v * i (∅)}. Proceeding recursively, consider a network g representing the links among our n individuals. Suppose that the set of stable subnetworks of g given norm x, Γ(g), has been defined, along 10 Of course, one might conceive of still more general punishment structures in which verifiable information decays -perhaps probabilistically -as it radiates along a path, but we avoid these for the sake of simplicity.
with collections of stable payoff vectors for each of those subnetworks v * (g). Now. consider the network g, and pick some consistent transfer scheme x generated by norm x on g, with attendant payoff vector v. Consider any individual i. For any realization θ, by abiding to the ongoing transfer scheme, i obtains a lifetime (normalized) expected payoff of (4) (
In contrast, if i deviates by not honoring commitments to a set of neighbors S, a level-q punishment will set the new graph to g , which is obtained by removing from g all direct links to i that are from individuals who are no more than q steps distant from some member of S (but the connecting path should include the original deviant). Thus, the continuation payoff will depend on two things: the set of players who are her "victims", and the value of q that determines the punishment level. Formally, the payoff to i of such deviation is then
How is v i in (5) determined? To describe the continuation payoffs following a deviation, we must adopt a convention that tells us the payoffs that accrue to player i when she finds herself at some network g ⊂ g.
If g is stable, it is to be expected that i will enjoy a payoff of v i , where this is the ith component of some stable payoff vector for g . If g is not stable, the resulting payoff will be presumably drawn from some stable subnetwork of g itself. Two often-used devices to pin down the precise outcome in the face of potential multiplicity are "optimistic" and "pessimistic" beliefs (see, e.g., Greenberg (1990)). 11 We assume that if g is not stable then a subnetwork g would form where g is the or one of the largest stable subnetworks of g to which i belongs. In this case, v i is the ith component of some stable payoff vector for g . We do not insist on any particular selection rule at this conceptual stage, but we must take note of the "baseline" graph that player i induces on her deviation. This depends on two things: the set of players who are her "victims", and the value of q that determines the punishment level.
Comparing (5) and (4), we may therefore say that a transfer scheme x is q-stable under x if it is consistent, and if for every player i, every state θ and every set of direct neighbors S of i,
Stability requires that for all possible state realizations, the stipulated transfers be actually carried out. Finally, say that the network g is q-stable for a norm x if it admits a q-stable transfer scheme under x.
Similarly, we can define a concept of stability associated with the strong punishment. A transfer scheme x in a network g is strongly stable if it is consistent and if for every individual i, state θ and every subset S of i's neighbors, inequality (6) holds with v i = v * (∅). We say that a network g is strongly stable if it admits a strongly stable transfer scheme.
Notice that the inequality (6) can be rewritten as
This inequality requires that the short term deviation gain from not making the transfers due, on the left-hand-side, be smaller than the long term gain from remaining in the risk sharing agreement rather than being ostracized by the people who hear of the deviation, on the righthand-side. Clearly, for values of δ close to one, long term effects matter dominate while short term effects matter for lower values of the discount rate.
We are interested in analyzing the role of the network architecture on network stability. To this purpose, we will isolate and analyze two different effects that pertain to social networks are critical for their stability: the transit effect, a short-term effect, and the punishment capacity of networks, a long term effect. The next section focuses on the latter aspect by looking at high values of the discount factor. In Section 5, we then consider lower discounting values to examine transit or "bottleneck" effects.
Stable Networks for High Discount Factors.
In this section we attempt to describe the set of q-stable networks. [To be sure, this is a very different concept of stability than Jackson (2001 Jackson ( , 2004 and Baya and Goyal (2000)]. Throughout, we concentrate on the case in which discount factors are "sufficiently" close to unity in order to focus on the long-term effect on networks, that is the punishment values of networks.
4.1. Universal Stability. Our model accommodates an enormous variety of transfer norms. One difficult and possibly not very insightful project would be to try and classify the set of stable networks for each social norm. It turns out that the question becomes more tractable (and the answer possibly interesting) when we study networks that are "universally stable" in the sense that they are stable over a class of transfer norms.
Formally, fix some hierarchy q of information flow and let X be any collection of transfer norms. Say that a network g is universally q-stable for the class X of norms if for every norm x in that class, there exists a threshold discount factorδ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), g is q-stable.
Thus a universally stable network is simultaneously robust over a full variety of transfer norms. It is an appealing concept as we don't have to know exactly what the norm is. 4.2. Sparse Networks. In this section, we formalize a certain notion of a "sparsely connected" network. This notion is related to the length of minimal cycles connecting any three agents in the network. 13 For any triple of agents (i, j, k) such that (i, j) and (j, k) are connected in the network, we may compute the length of the smallest cycle connecting i, j and k, (i, j, k). By convention, if there is no cycle connecting those three points, we define (i, j, k) = 2. For any integer q ≥ 0, say that a graph g is q-sparse if all minimal cycles connecting three agents in the network have length smaller or equal to q + 2.
12 Notice, however, that in our definition of universal stability the threshold discount factor is permitted to depend on the particular member chosen from the class. If the class is finite this is not a problem. 13 We are grateful to Anna Bogomolnaia whose comments suggested this definition to us.
Note that if a network is q-sparse, then it is q -sparse for all q ≥ q. Observe also that all networks which only have trees as their components are 0-sparse -there are no cycles connecting any three points in a tree -and that this fully describes the set of 0-sparse networks. On the other hand, the complete network is 1 − sparse, as any three agents are connected by a cycle of length 3. For a connected network of size n, the graph architecture with the highest index of sparseness is the circle, where any three agents are connected by a cycle of length n, so that the circle is n − 2 sparse. As an illustration, Table 1 characterizes the lowest q-sparseness of the different network architectures for 8 connected agents illustrated in Figure 3 . We will see that sparseness and universal stability are closely connected for monotone transfer norms.
Universal Stability for Monotone Transfer Norms.

Proposition 2. A network g is universally q-stable under the class of all monotone transfer norms if and only if it is q-sparse.
Proposition 2 establishes a one-to-one relationship between q-sparseness and universal q-stability for monotone norms. We sketch the argument briefly. The following lemma is useful:
graph g is q-sparse if and only if, for every linked pair ij ∈ g, the graph formed by removing from g the links to i along all paths of length m ≤ q + 1 between i and j has strictly more components than g.
Now, consider a graph g and a consistent transfer scheme x. Assume that an agent i reneges on the transfers she owes to one or more partners. Then the immediate victims certainly sever their links to i, and so do all individuals (connected to i) who are connected to any of them (but not through i!) via a path of length q or less. If the graph g is q-sparse, then, in the resulting subgraph, i will find herself in a smaller component. For monotone norms, this implies a discrete loss in expected utility. Since difference in continuation utility drives stability at high discount factors, q-sparse graphs are universally q-stable for monotone norms.
Conversely, to show that if a graph is not q-sparse it cannot be q-stable for all monotone norms, recall that equal division belongs to the class of monotone norms. Under equal division, the consumptions of all linked individuals are equalized in every state. It follows that the expected utility of a member of a given social network only depends on the size of the component to which he belongs. If a network is not q-sparse then we can always find an pair of individuals such that, if one reneges on her transfer to the other then applying the q-level sanctions result in a subgraph with the same number of components. In this case, the agent would enjoy the very same level of utility as in the original graph and therefore would never have any incentive to honor a transfer due to the other agent.
Strong and Weak Punishment.
It is particularly interesting to contrast the universal stability of networks across different punishment schemes. For values of δ close to 1, all network are strongly stable. In contrast, for weaker punishment schemes, the density of links weakens punishments and has important consequences for network stability. In particular, under weak punishment only trees are stable for high discount rates.
Corollary 1. Under weak punishment, a network g is universally stable for all monotone transfer norms if and only if it has only trees as components. While under strong punishment, all networks are universally stable for all monotone transfer norms.
4.5. Density and Stability. Figure 3 and Table 1 suggest that there is no monotonic relation between the sparseness of a network, and its density as measured by the number of links. Very thin networks such as trees and very dense networks such as the complete graph tend to have low sparseness indices. Intermediate graph structures on the other hand have higher sparseness indices, suggesting a U-shaped relation between sparseness and the number of links. For instance, for q = 1, only the line (a.), the complete graph (d.) and the bridge (e.) architectures are stable.
In order to test this hypothesis, we run simulations on the network structure. Consider a community of ten individuals. We generate random networks of size 10 for each possible number of links in this community and assess the networks' universal q-stability for different values of q. Figure 4 maps the proportion of universally q-stable networks on network density. Each curves correspond to a different level of punishment q ranging from 0 to 9. Naturally, the stronger the punishment the larger the proportion of stable graphs, such that higher curves correspond to larger q's. To be sure, networks of intermediate density tend to be unstable. 
Short-Term or Transit Effects
In this Section, we analyze the short-run effects of network architectures which emerge for lower values of the discount factor. In order to isolate the short-run effects, we consider a specific model with equal sharing norm and strong punishment. In that model, the long run utility of an agent who complies to the insurance scheme, v i , only depends on the size of the component and the long run utility following a deviation, v i = v i (∅), is independent of the network and of the set of links on which an agent deviates. Hence, the network architecture only affects the self-enforcement constraint through the short run effects of a deviation.
5.1. Bottleneck Agents. Under the equal sharing norm, for a fixed component d of size m and a state θ with income realization y,
The short run gain from a deviation at state θ is thus given by:
In order to check the stability of a graph, we thus need to check, component by component, and for every vector of income realization, the incentives of the agent(s) for which (8) is maximal. We call this agent or these agents the bottleneck(s) of the transfer scheme. If all agents face the same maximal short-term incentive to deviate (8) in at least one state, we say that there is no bottleneck agent.
For general graphs where transfers can flow along different links, the identification of bottleneck agents is a complex task, as it depends on the exact routing of transfers. The analysis of bottleneck agents is much easier in trees, where every pair of agents is connected by a single path, and in order to gain intuition, we illustrate below the concept of bottleneck agents for two different trees: a star and a line with four agents. In the star, not surprisingly, when the number of good states is greater than two, the bottleneck is the center of the star, which is called to make the maximal transfers. Similarly, in the line, the bottleneck agent is always one of the two central agents. What is more surprising is that the constraints faced by the bottleneck agents is the same in the two graphs. For any k good realizations, the bottleneck agent receives transfer from k − 1 agents both in the star and the line, and her maximal deviation payoff is given by
in both graphs. The next result shows that this is not an accident: stability conditions are identical for a large class of networks which satisfy a simple decomposability condition.
Decomposable Networks.
We define a subnetwork of g originating at i as a subgraph g obtained by removing only some of i's links : g ⊂ g and if jk ∈ g then jk ∈ g for any j, k = i. In a decomposable connected network of size m, for any integer k ∈ [1, m − 1], one can identify a bottleneck agent through which transfers must flow from some subset of k agents for some realization of the state. It is easy to check that both the star and the line are decomposable networks. In the star, the central individual is critical of degree k for all k. In the line where agents are ordered as 1, 2, ..., m, the kth agent is critical of degree k. The next Proposition shows that all decomposable networks have the same stability property.
Proposition 3. For any two decomposable connected networks g and g of size m, g is stable if and only if g is stable.
The intuition for this result is the following. Consider a connected and decomposable network. For any given income realization, call givers the individuals who are called upon making a positive net transfer to the network. Take a realization y and assume that there are k givers. It follows from the decomposability of the network that there is a critical node i of degree k. Since the income distribution is symmetric, there is a permutation of y, say y in which all givers are in the component of size k of the subnetwork originating at i. We show that individual i's incentive constraint is the hardest to satisfy under y , and that this constraint is at least as difficult to satisfy than any of the constraints under the original income realization y. Moreover, this particular constraint is the very same for all decomposable and connected networks of same size. Since this is true for all income realizations, all decomposable and connected networks of same size will have the very same stability properties.
Why do we focus on decomposable networks? These networks are particularly interesting as, not only they encompass well-known graphs such the line and the star, but also are interesting as it is the class of networks for which the bottleneck problem is the most acute. Indeed, the following proposition tells us that decomposable graphs are the networks for which the selfenforcing constraints are the hardest to satisfy. Adding link to a connected decomposable network can render it non-decomposable while the converse is not true. Hence, it can only relax the bottleneck effect. The addition of new links will always result in more stable graphs, as new links open the possibility of rerouting transfers, and relax the constraint of the bottleneck agent.
Corollary 2. Consider two graphs g and g with the same components and g ⊂ g . Then if g is stable, g is stable.
Remark that, as a consequence, for any connected graph g, if g is stable, the complete graph g c is stable. Examples can easily be provided to show that the reverse implication does not necessarily hold.
Notice that this remark does not show that the complete graph is the easiest graph to sustain. The inequality is only true among connected graphs and disconnected graphs, with smaller components, may be easier to sustain. In fact, there is no obvious reason why the enforcement constrained faced by community members should be monotonic in the number of agents in a component. To illustrate this point consider the simple case, already used earlier, in which the endowments are i.i.d. across agents and take on just two values: h with probability p and with probability (1 − p), with h > > 0. The following example computes the threshold value δ as a function of the size of the graph. It appears that the threshold value is non monotonic in the size of the graph.
Example 1. Take utilities to be u(c) = 2c
1/2 , = 0, h = 1 and p = 0.2.
In a complete graph, no transfer is ever mediated. This implies that the binding constraint for an agent is whether to keep her income when it receives a high shock or not. In other words, the maximal deviation is given by
This expression is clearly maximized when k = 1 so the constraint becomes
We compute
Figure 8 pictures δ as a function of n for n ∈ {1, ..., 100}.
Mixing Long Run and Short Run Effects.
In general, the stability of networks depends on the interplay between long run and short run effects. For different values of the discount factor, different stable networks will emerge, as the short run effect dominates for low values of δ and the long run effect for high values of δ. In order to gain intuition about the variation of stable networks with changes in the discount factor, we consider here a simple example of an equal sharing norm with weak punishment. Because we consider weak punishment (or 0-stability), trees emerge as the unique stable networks for high values of the discount factor. For lower values of δ, complete graphs emerge as stable network architectures. However, stable networks are not necessarily connected. Surprisingly, for p = 0.2, the complete connected graph is stable for low values of δ, then becomes unstable, and becomes stable again for higher values of the discount factor.
6. Discussion and Possible Extensions 6.1. Sparseness and Decomposability. The analysis of long run and short run effects has led to the definition of two properties of social networks: sparseness and decomposability. At a superficial level, these two properties seem to be connected, as they both imply that the graph possesses a small number of links. However, because they reflect very different properties of the network, it is easy to see that sparseness and decomposability are different concepts, and that sparse graphs may not be decomposable, and decomposable graphs may not be sparse. Figure  10 illustrates this very clearly with two networks of 7 agents. The first graph shows a treerecall that trees have sparseness 0-which is not decomposable, while the second network is decomposable and has sparseness 2. One could imagine pushing these ideas further and have a punishment consistent the following communication protocol : information is transmitted only via individuals who know the person concerned. The idea is that before relaying to a person information on x, one would first ask to the person if she knows x. If she does, then the information is transmitted but otherwise not. In our model, knowing the person is taken to mean having a link with the person. We can define a new punishment structure using this particular communication protocol.
Information Sharing. Information on a deviation is transmitted from an agent to another if and only if they are linked to each other and to the deviant. Following a deviation, all informed agents sever direct links with the deviant.
Formally, say that i is strongly connected to k via j if there exists a sequence of individuals
Using arguments similar to Proposition 2, it is is easy to show that a network g is universally stable under information sharing for the class of all monotone transfer norms if and only if for every linked pair ij ∈ g, the graph formed by removing from g the links between i and all individuals strongly connected to i via j has strictly more components than g.
Intuitively the clustering coefficient discussed in Section 4.6 will be particularly important for stability under our information protocol. We illustrate this using a specific example and simulations. Figure 11 pictures three different graphs with 8 individuals having 3 links each. The clustering coefficient of each individual is indicated next to her node. In the first network, the wheel, each individual has a clustering coefficient of 0. It follows that, for high values of δ, this graph won't be stable. Next, consider the neighbor network. If individual i in the Figure defects on a transfer to individual j, where both have clustering coefficients of 2/3, then our information protocol would isolate and effectively punish i. In contrast, if it is individual k (whose clustering coefficient is only 1/3) who defects on i, we see that our information protocol will be unable to punish him. Hence, graph b. is also unstable. Finally, look at the cliques. Here individual are clustered in two cliques of four individuals. Their clustering coefficient is 1 and therefore it is possible to fully isolate any deviant. Hence, the graph is universally stable for monotone norms. Using the same simulation technique as in Section 4.6, we simulate a large number of network of size 10 for each possible density level and assess their their stability under our information protocol. Figure 5 reports the results. The crosses represent the proportion of universally stable graph under our information protocol for different clustering coefficients. Except for the empty graph, we see that the relationship between stability and clustering is clearly positive under our information protocol, and even stronger than for q-punishment.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model of risk-sharing in social networks. Only individuals who are linked can make transfer to each other. There are two important features to our model. First, a risk-sharing arrangement at the level of network results from a collection of bilateral arrangement among linked individuals. Second, in choosing the transfer to make to each other, a pair of linked individuals follow a transfer norm that prescribe a transfer to be made as a function of the individuals' income, identities and their net obligations to others in the network. As these obligations are endogenous, we focus on transfer schemes that satisfy a society-wide consistency: a consistent transfer scheme is a fixed point of these bilateral state-contingent transfers.
After characterizing conditions for existence of consistent transfer schemes, we assess the stability of insurance networks stressing that to be stable a risk-sharing network must be self-enforcing. Two important factors affect the stability of insurance networks: a transit effect and an information effect determining the severity of punishment in the network.
Studying the stability of networks for monotone social norms, we show that the severity of punishment in a network is closely related to a specific concept of sparseness. As a result, at high levels of discount rate, all networks are stable under strong punishment, while only networks of trees are stable under weak punishment. For intermediate level of punishment both very dense graphs and minimally connected graphs are stable while graphs of intermediary density are harder to sustain.
The structure of the network is also important for the transit effect. A high amount of transfers going through a particular agent provides her with a strong short term incentive to deviate from the insurance scheme. This effect can be clearly illustrated for the equal sharing norm in the case of strong punishment. We show that all decomposable networks share the same stability conditions, and have the most acute transit effect. Hence, they are the hardest networks to sustain.
By introducing a model of risk-sharing networks, this paper opens the door to much future research. There are a number of possible extensions of our analysis. First, different social norms have different stability properties. Comparing them would give us insights on the endogenous emergence of insurance norms. Second, we have explored one source of instability of insurance networks: the lack of commitment. There are many other possible sources of instability. For instance, many other interesting issues emerge in situations where incomes are only imperfectly observed. Finally, allowing for link formation and analyzing the endogenous formation of risksharing networks is an important issue for future work.
8. Proofs 8.1. Consistent Transfer Scheme. Let g be a social network. Let x be a full collection of bilateral transfer schemes for every linked pair k ∈ g; i.e., x = {x k (θ)} k ∈g . For a particular linked pair ij, this collection of bilateral schemes induces third-party transfers conditional on the realization of each state:
If the existing bilateral scheme for ij is indeed prescribed by the bilateral transfer norm given the collection (z i , z j , y i , y j ) (and g of course), and if this is simultaneously true for every linked pair, we will say that x is a consistent transfer scheme. Proposition 1 gives sufficient conditions for a transfer scheme in a social network to be consistent. Proof of Proposition 1.
[Existence] Fix a network g. Denote by M (θ) the size of the bound in state θ. Let X be the set of all transfer schemes such that
where |g| is the number of pairs linked in g.
Given a transfer norm X , define the following mapping φ X (x) for all x ∈ X. Pick x ∈ X. For every linked pair ij ∈ g and θ, construct the agent's net transfer from others (z i (θ), z j (θ)) as in (9) . Now for each linked pair ij ∈ g and for any state θ, build x ij (θ) by setting
provided that the absolute value does not exceed M (θ). Otherwise, set x ij equal to M (θ) or to −M (θ) as the case may be. Let φ X (x) = x . Note that by construction x ij (θ) ∈ [−M θ , M θ ] for all i,j and θ. So φ X is a mapping from X to X. Moreover, it is a continuous map. Consequently, the existence of a fixed point x * , φ X (x * ) = x * for some x * ∈ X is guaranteed by Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
It remains to prove that any fixed point of φ X yields strictly positive consumption to all individuals in all states. Suppose this is false for some fixed point x * . We know that in any connected component d all consumptions cannot be negative, as aggregate income is positive. Hence, there exists a linked pair of agents ij ∈ d and a state θ such that c i (θ) ≤ 0 and c j (θ) > 0. By our assumption, it must be that i is making no transfer to j, and her output y i (θ) > 0. So she must be making a transfer to some other set of individuals, say K. By the same logic, c k (θ) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ K. Repeating this argument for all individuals in K (and continuing if necessary), we see that ultimately we must encounter a pair of linked individuals -say m -such that makes a positive transfer to m, c (θ) ≤ 0, and c m (θ) > 0. This is a contradiction.
Universal Stability.
Proof of Lemma 1. Sufficiency. Suppose that there exists a triple of agents i, j and k with a shortest cycle of length greater than q + 2. Let j delete his link with i. Then the length of the path between i and k in the cycle is greater than q, and because the cycle is minimal, there is no other path between i and k of smaller size. But this implies that if one deletes all links to j along paths from j to i of size smaller or equal to q + 1, link jk remains. In particular, this implies that j remains linked to i in the resulting graph, and remains linked (through i) to all agents who have severed their direct link to j. Hence, the number of components of the graph has not changed. Necessity. Conversely, consider a link ij for which the deletion of all links to i along the paths to j of size smaller than q +1 does not increase the number of components in the graph. This implies that i and j remain connected in the graph, so that there exists an agent k directly connected to i , such that all paths from k to j have size greater than q. Then, for the tripe k, j, i, all cycles connecting the three agents must have length greater than q + 2. 
which means that (6) is satisfied. Hence g is universally q-stable for the class of all monotone transfer norms. Now suppose that g is universally q-stable for the class of all monotone transfer norms. Then, by part (b) above, g must be q-stable for the equal-division norm. Now suppose, contrary to our assertion, that g is not q-sparse. Then, by Lemma 1, there is some component d of g (possibly g itself, of course) and some linked pair ij such that even if all links to i along paths of length q + 1 or less are removed between i and j, the resulting graph d is connected as well.
Consider the situation in which i has received the highest income realization while all other individuals received the lowest income (this event has positive probability). Using the convention that all links are used in this state, x ij < 0. We look at i's incentive not to renege on x ij and the resulting network g . Proof of Corollary 1. Networks that have only trees as components are the only network that are 0-sparse. Since stability under weak punishment corresponds to q-stability for q = 0, the proof of the fist part of the corollary is a direct application of Proposition 2.
Take any network g. There exists q such that g is q-sparse for q ≥ q. It follows from Proposition 2 that g is universally q-stable under monotone transfer norms for q ≥ q. That is, the inequality (6) where v i (g ) is determined by level q punishment for q ≥ q holds for every player i, every state θ and every set of direct neighbors S of i. Under strong punishment, any individual receives a payoff v * i (∅) following a deviation. To be sure, v i (g ) ≥ v * i (∅) for all i and g . Hence, (6) holds under strong punishment too and g is stable.
8.3. Short-Term Effects.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider two networks g and g of same size n. Take a realization y for these networks. Denote as Π(y) the set of permutations of y. Call an individual a giver if y i ≥ j y j /n and a recipient otherwise. Let γ(y) be the number of givers and R(y) the set of recipients in y. Let i be a critical node of degree γ. We claim that among the income realizations in Π(y), the tightest constraints is obtained for node i when all agents in the subnetwork of size γ originating at i are givers. For all income realization y ∈ Π(y) the average income is the same, such that (8) is maximal for i if it maximizes (10) y i + j|xij ≥0
x ij (y )
To equalize the incomes a total transfer of τ (y) ≡ j∈R(y) [ l y l /n − y j ] needs to be made from givers to recipients. Since i is critical of degree γ, when all agents in the subnetwork of size γ originating in i are givers, all transfers to be made need to transit via her. In this case, (10) clearly takes its maximal value l y l /n + τ (y) irrespective of i's particular income.
[The only other candidate would be a recipient j who receives exactly τ in transfers. But then (10) would be lower since y j < l y l /n.] Hence, for any realization in Π(y), the tightest constraint will be the same in any decomposable network. To compute the exact threshold value of δ for which a decomposable network is stable, one needs to find the state y which results in the tightest constraint, i.e. that solves the problem: (11) max
The solution y * of this problem depends on the shape of the utility function. Once y * is known, the threshold value can easily be computed.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let y * be the solution to the maximization problem (11) . If the network g has a critical node of degree γ(y * ) then clearly g and g have the same stability property. Otherwise, if g does not have a critical node of degree γ(y * ), the consumption can be equalized in a way that the highest consumption a deviating agent could achieve when y * is realized is strictly less than l y l /n + τ (y) and the conclusion follows.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider the binding constraint in graph g. Let θ be the corresponding realization of the shock, and i the agent whose constraint is binding. Compute a transfer scheme for graph g as follows. For any θ = θ, x(θ ) is the same for the two graphs. For θ, one may be able to relax the transfer constraint, by using additional links. In other words, if new links permit a rerouting of the transfers to bypass i, i s constraint will necessarily be relaxed.
